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Abstract
The paper investigates the effect of financial development on economic growth conditional
on the level of institutional quality for a panel of 21 Sub-Saharan African countries for the
period 1986-2010. A standard growth regression is estimated with linear interaction between
financial development and institutional quality. Our findings indicate that financial develop-
ment has not significantly contributed to SSA economic growth, contrary to the significant
positive effect of institutional quality. The interaction effect of both financial and institutional
development is positive but insignificant. This evidence suggest the existing institutions has
not enhanced the finance-growth relationship in the region. Therefore, improving institutions
relevant to the financial sector is desired.
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1 Introduction
The much ado about Africa’s recent growth performance has rekindled interest among economists
and policy experts in understanding the underlying factors despite her stagnant structural
fundamentals.1 So far, the list includes: investment, private sector access to credit, government
effectiveness (institutions), exports and share of agriculture value added; albeit their relative
stagnation as indicated by statistical analysis (Mijiyawa, 2013). In terms of institutional quality
and financial sector performance, Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are making inroads with
significant improvement in the institutional environment and financial deepening. Differences in
∗Correspondence address: Department of Economics, University of Uyo, P.M.B 1017, Uyo, Akwa Ibom, Nigeria.
Email: ekpenoeffiong@uniuyo.edu.ng; ekpenol@gmail.com. Tel. +234 802 789 0160
1Africa has experienced recovery in her growth performance since 1995 after decades of stagnation from 1974.
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institutional quality and financial development can have significant impact on economic growth.
Hence, World Bank emphasizes on building effective institutions and promoting financial sector
development as priorities both in the now and future.2
From growth empirics, one strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of financial
development (see Levine, 2005) while the other centres on the role of institutions on economic
growth (see Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Recently, both strands of the growth literature have
been combined to investigate the effect of financial development on economic growth conditional
on a country’s institutional quality. The central thesis involves examining the interaction between
institutions and finance on growth since both factors can be either complements or substitutes.
So far, evidence of such interaction is mixed and inconclusive. While Demetriades and Law
(2006) and Anwar and Cooray (2012) found that finance and institutions are complements, Ahlin
and Pang (2008) and Compton and Giedeman (2011) showed that both factors are substitutes
in the growth process. Such can be traced to the use of heterogeneous cross-country samples
of both developed and developing countries without considering their individual and region-
specific economic characteristics, which can have significant influence on the outcome, and thus,
a generalization of policy prescriptions that is of little relevance to the latter since the former
have a well-developed financial sector and good institutions. To circumvent this, a region-specific
analysis involving homogeneous countries with similar economic fundamentals, culture and history
is necessary so as to derive policy implications for the region (and the countries that belong to it)
as in Anwar and Cooray (2012) for South Asia.
This paper examines the interaction effect between financial development and institutions on
economic growth within the context of SSA countries. The interest in SSA is motivated by two
reasons. First, the uneven levels of financial development and institutional quality in the world
necessitates the use of a sample of countries from a geographic region with homogeneity in terms of
real per capita GDP, financial development and institutions. Second, SSA countries have reformed
their economic system since the late 1980s with the objective of promoting growth through
improved efficiency in the financial sector and for institutional development. It is expedient to
document the progress achieved by linking reforms with economic performance. For this purpose,
a standard growth regression model is estimated with a sample of 21 SSA countries for the period
1986-2010 using panel data techniques of ordinary least squares (OLS) and system generalized
method of moments (SYS-GMM) for dynamic panel analysis.
The evidence suggest that institutional quality rather than financial development has contrib-
uted significantly to the growth performance of SSA countries. However, their interaction effect,
although positive (which suggest that both factors are complements) is statistically insignificant.
As such, the existing institutional quality has not enhanced the finance-growth relationship in the
region.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature survey on
2see the 2002 World Development Report on ‘Building institutions for market’
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the links between financial development, institutions and economic growth. Section 3 details
the empirical methodology and data for the analysis; while the empirical results and concluding
remarks are contained in Section 4 and 5 respectively.
2 Links Between Finance, Institutions and Growth
An extensive literature exist on the relationship between finance and economic growth. The crux
of the finance-growth nexus is that better-functioning and deepened financial sector accelerates
economic growth.3 From a theoretical standpoint, financial institutions and markets facilitates
the efficiency of the savings-investment process. Financial intermediaries arises to mitigate the
effect of financial frictions — particularly, information and transaction costs — which distort
the allocation of resources to productive investment opportunities. Levine (2005) maintains
that finance influences economic growth by ameliorating these frictions through five traditional
functions. These functions include: acquiring information about investment for efficient allocation
of capital; risk amelioration; monitoring and exerting corporate governance control on both
managers and firms respectively; mobilizing and pooling savings; and facilitating exchange of
goods and services. The efficiency to which these functions are accomplished influences savings
and investment decisions, which in turn, determines economic growth.4 At the empirical level,
researchers agree that a positive relation exist between finance and economic growth. Cross-country
studies based on cross-sectional and panel data analysis suggest that finance helps to predict
growth (see King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000;
Khan and Senhadji, 2003; Hassan et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2012), while similar conclusion is also
reached by country-specific studies that employ time-series analysis (see Demetriades and Hussein,
1996; Odedokun, 1996; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Luintel et al., 2008). Studies have equally
shown that financial development contributes to economic growth in SSA (see Ghirmay, 2004;
Agbetsiafa, 2004; Akinlo and Egbetunde, 2010), whereas, Demetriades and James (2011) found
that the finance-growth relationship in the region is a loose one: at best, finance follows growth;
at worst, there is an insignificant long-run link between the two.5
Despite the plethora of empirical evidence, the direction of causality remains a reference point
for disagreement with mixed conclusion as causality varies between countries and regions.6 For
example, Hassan et al. (2011) found a two-way causality between finance and growth in all regions
of the world except SSA and East Asia and Pacific, while causality runs from growth to finance
in South Asia and SSA supporting the hypothesis that growth leads to finance in developing
3(Levine, 1997, 2005) provides an excellent survey of both the theoretical and empirical literature.
4Additionally, financial intermediaries are more efficient in providing evaluation and monitoring services by
identifying and investing in credit-worthy and productivity-enhancing projects.
5The worst case scenario is obtained when financial development is measured using bank credit while the
best-case scenario occurs when measured by liquid liabilities which only indicates the size of bank balance sheets.
6Three directions of causality can be identified from the finance-growth literature. First, the causal direction
from finance to growth which supports the supply-leading hypothesis; while the second runs from growth to finance
emphasizing the demand-following hypothesis. Third, is a bi-directional causality which runs from finance to growth
in the early stages of development, and later stages from growth to finance.
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countries because of the increasing demand for financial services. On the other hand, Acaravci et al.
(2009) found a bi-directional causality for a panel of 24 SSA counries.7 Such variation in causality
is deemed to reflect institutional differences across countries.8 Arestis and Demetriades (1997)
and, Demetriades and Law (2006) maintain that such varying causal relationships may reflect
differences in the quality of finance, which in turn, is determined by the quality of institutions
(such as financial regulation and the rule of law). Therefore, the proposition “more finance, more
growth” holds little applicability as corruption in the banking system or political interference,
may divert credit to unproductive or even wasteful activities. In fact, the alternative, “better
finance, more growth”, is more embracing when the financial system is embedded within a sound
institutional framework. Financial development reverberates not only from the market forces
but through political and property rights institutions which are necessary in financing contracts
(Marcelin and Mathur, 2014). Hence, our hypothesis that the contribution of financial development
to long-run economic growth is determined in part by the quality of a country’s institutions.
In recent decades, institutions as a fundamental cause of economic growth has received
accelerated interest among researchers and policy experts. The evidence suggest that a country’s
institutional framework is crucial in determining her economic performance (Knack and Keefer,
1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Rodrik et al., 2004;
Akpan and Effiong, 2012; Nawaz, 2015). For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001) used European settler
mortality rates to instrument for institutions and, found large effects of institutions on income
per capita. Nawaz (2015) found that improvement in institutions leads to accelerated growth.
A country’s institutional framework — consisting of formal and informal rules — constitutes
the “rules of the game” that shapes interactions at the political, social and economic spheres
as well as the behaviour of economic agents in a society. Institutions establishes the incentive
structure, which if good, reduces transactions cost, uncertainty and promotes production efficiency.
This in turn, facilitates investment in human and physical capital, technological innovations and
advancement, private sector development, all of which contributes to economic growth. In other
words, strong institutions are associated with increasing levels of real income per capita since they
shape overall condition for investment and growth. Institutions such as secured property rights,
better contract enforcement, strong rule of law, control of corruption, political stability etc. are
seen to support a country’s growth process.9
Furthermore, there is also an established literature that links legal institutions with financial
development.10 Well-functioning financial markets depends on legal institutions that can adequately
enforce financial contracts so as to prevent obstacles to financial intermediation (Fergusson,
7see Acaravci et al. (2009) for a survey of the finance-growth literature for SSA.
8The divergence in the trend of financial development in most cases is caused by the quality of institutions
across countries. Cross-country variations in institutional quality affects financing options and firms’ ability to
access external finance (Marcelin and Mathur, 2014). Therefore, the ability of financial intermediaries to resolve
information and transaction costs reflects a country’s overall institutional quality.
9Developing countries inability to design a strong institutional framework is the reason for the prevalence of
their weak institutions and underdevelopment.
10Beck and Levine (2005) and Fergusson (2006) provide an excellent survey of the literature on legal institutions
and financial development.
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2006). Whereas, better institutions can facilitate access to finance by overcoming the effects of
information and transaction cost, the converse can also be expected when institutions are weak.
Securing property rights and contract enforcement by the legal system places a constraint against
government expropriation — hence determining the quality of the financial market (Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic, 2002; Levine, 2005). On the theoretical front, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argues
that legal origin that spread across the world through colonization and imitation had considerable
effects on the level of financial development. The argument is that British (common law) legal
traditions were conducive to the protection of property rights and hence financial development
unlike that of the French.11 Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Beck et al. (2003) emphasize the role
of interest groups in the financial development process.12 For instance, incumbent interest groups
(political elites) with their market (political) power may retard financial development by preventing
the adoption of better institutions if future competition reduces their rents or limit their power.
Roe and Siegel (2011) argues for the role of political stability for financial sector development.
Empirically, studies have shown that legal institutions clearly contributes to financial sector
development (see Djankov et al., 2005; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Huang, 2010). For SSA, McDonald
and Schumacher (2007) found that legal institutions and information sharing have deeper effects
on financial development. Anayiotos and Toroyan (2009) found that institutional factors affect
financial depth and access to financial services more than asset quality and profitability.
Following these strands of literature, researchers now acknowledge that financial development
can indirectly influence economic growth through institutional development as a conditioning
variable. In other words, the institutional quality channel is another path through which financial
development can influence economic performance. The literature on the joint effect that finance
and institutions have on economic growth is nascent and still developing. So far, existing studies
have reached mixed conclusions. Demetriades and Law (2006) examined the interaction between
finance, institutions on economic development for a sample of 72 countries for the period 1978-2000
using cross-sectional and panel approaches. Concentrating on bank-based financial development
measures and an aggregate measure of instutitional quality, they found that financial development
has larger effects on GDP per capita within a sound institutional framework. Their findings
is more potent for middle-income countries. However, for poor countries with low institutional
quality, they conclude that finance may not deliver the desired impact on economic development
except through improvement in institutions. Hence, the proposition that “better finance, more
growth” is more applicable than “more finance, more growth”.
Ahlin and Pang (2008) considered the same issue with particular focus on an aspect of
institutional quality namely, corruption control, whether both are complements or substitutes
11The French legal tradition was relatively weak in private property rights protection as it emphasized the power
of the state over the individual and making the judiciary redundant. The British system, however, sort to protect
individual private property rights against the crown. Hence, countries that adopted the British legal traditions over
that the French are tend to have better financial markets.
12This is the political view of financial development. The thesis is that non-democratic states use their political
power to restrict entry or competition for continuous rents extraction for existing financial development (such as
banks).
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in the growth process. They found both finance and corruption control to be substitutes. Here,
the marginal benefit of improving financial development is greater when a country has higher
corruption levels than at lower levels. Thus, when corruption falls, the effect on growth is higher in
an economy with low levels of financial development than in a financially developed economy. Such
outcome is because higher corruption levels is associated with higher burden for less financially
developed country than developed ones. Compton and Giedeman (2011) considered a sample of
90 countries from 1970 to 2004 to investigate whether the state of institutions impacts on the
finance-growth nexus. Using both bank and stock market measures of financial development, their
evidence showed that for the case of bank-based measures, the interaction with institutions is
negative. This means that the effect of banking development on growth is smaller in countries
with strong institutions than those with weak institutions. For stock market development, their
interaction with institutions is insignificant, meaning that its effects on growth is independent of a
country’s level of institutions. Lastly, Anwar and Cooray (2012) concentrated on the case of South
Asia for the period 1970-2009. Measuring institutional quality with Freedom House political and
civil liberties and Polity IV democracy index, they found that institutions enhances the impact of
finance on growth as both factors are complements in the growth process for South Asia.
From the foregoing, examining the interaction effect between finance and institutions on
economic growth becomes expedient especially from the perspectives of other regions in the world
with similarities in institutional quality, level of financial development and economic performance
across its constituent countries. This study makes a contribution to the literature by focussing
specifically on SSA countries given their similarities in economic performance, financial development
and state of institutions. This is relevant for future policy directions depending on whether
institutions and finance are complements or substitutes in SSA growth process. Complementarity
of these factors would suggest policies targeted at simultaneously improving both institutional
quality and financial development, whereas substitutability would imply focussing on a single
factor per time.
3 Econometric Strategy
3.1 Model Specification
To explore the relationship between finance, institutions and economic growth, we consider as a
starting point, the direct effect of finance on economic growth by specifying a standard growth
regression model as below:
Growthi,t = γIncomei,t−1 + β′Xi,t + ψ1Financei,t + ηi + µt + εi,t (1)
where Income denotes the (logarithm) level of GDP per capita, and Growth is its growth rate,
Finance captures financial development indicators. Xi,t is a matrix of control variables, i stands
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for a country and t represents a time period. µt is time dummies to account for time-specific
effects, ηi is an unobserved country-specific effects and εi,t is an idiosyncratic error term.
Since our main hypothesis is to examine the effects of financial development on economic
growth conditional on the level of institutional quality, we augment Eq.(1) with an institutional
variable (Institutions) and interact both indicators of financial development and institutional
quality, and then test for the significance of the interaction coefficient. In order to ensure that the
interaction term does not proxy for finance or institutions, we add these variables separately into
the regression as follows:
Growthi,t = γIncomei,t−1 + β′Xi,t + ψ1Financei,t + ψ2Institutionsi,t
+ψ3[Financei,t × Institutionsi,t] + ηi + µt + εi,t
(2)
From Eq.(2), emphasis is on the statistical significance of the interaction coefficient ψ3. Depending
on its sign, it can be inferred whether finance and institutions are complements or subtitutes in
the growth process. A negative coefficient will indicate that financial development is more effective
in boosting economic growth in countries with weak institutions. In other words, a negative
interaction (i. e. ψ3 < 0) provides evidence of substitutability between finance and institutions.
On the other hand, a positive interaction (i. e. ψ3 > 0) would imply that the growth effects of
finance are enhanced in a strong institutional environment, thus supporting the complementarity
of finance and institutions.
Eq.(2) can be estimated by OLS. However, neither does OLS eliminate the unobservable
country-specific effects nor does it deal with possible endoegenity in the regressors. For growth
models with dynamic panel specification, the generalized-methods-of-moments (GMM) estimators
of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is far
superior to other panel data estimators. The GMM panel estimators controls for both time and
country-specific effects while using appropriate lags of the regressors as instruments to address
the endogeneity problem. Eq.(2) can be written in its compact form with yi,t as the logarithm of
the real per capita GDP and Xi,t as a set of regressors that include an indicator of both finance
and institutions, their interactions and other control variables as below:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (γ − 1)yi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + ηi + µt + εi,t (3)
Alternatively, Eq.(3) can be rewritten as follows:
yi,t = γyi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + ηi + µt + εi,t (4)
The presence of country-specific effects ηi makes the fixed effects (within-group) estimators biased
and inconsistent because it is correlated with the lagged dependent variable yi,t−1. Arellano and
Bond (1991) proposed the following first-difference equation to eliminate the country-specific
effect:
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yi,t − yi,t−1 = γ(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + (Xi,t −Xi,t−1)′β
+(µt − µt−1) + (εi,t − εi,t−1)
(5)
However, this introduces a new endogeneity bias. First, the new error term, (εi,t − εi,t−1), is
correlated with the lagged dependent variable, (yi,t−1 − yi,t−2). Second, regressors are correlated
with the lagged error term, εi,t−1. The differenced GMM (DIF-GMM) estimators uses as intruments,
lagged values (two or more) of the regresors under two moment conditions: (i) the idiosyncratic
error term εi,t is not serially correlated; (ii) the regressors in Xi,t are weakly exogenous. These
moment conditions can be written as follows:
E[yi,t−s, (εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 ∀s ≥ 2; t = 3 . . . T
E[Xi,t−s, (εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 ∀s ≥ 2; t = 3 . . . T
(6)
Blundell and Bond (1998) argues that the GMM (DIF-GMM) estimator suffers from weak
instruments as the data becomes highly persistent. Weak instruments lead to serious finite sample
bias as such the variance of the coefficients become asymptotically large. The SYS-GMM estimator
is more efficient in handling the weak instruments problem (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998). It combines both the equations in levels and first-difference as a system, while
utilizing a larger sets of instruments. The instruments for the level equations are the lagged
differences of the regressors. The validity of the additional instruments requires additional moment
conditions: the first differences of the regressors in Eq.(4) are uncorrelated with the country-specific
effects ηi. The moment conditions for the levels equations are as follows:
E[(yi,t−s − yi,t−s−1), (µi + εi,t)] = 0 ∀s = 1; t = 3 . . . T
E[(Xi,t−s −Xi,t−s−1), (µi + εi,t)] = 0 ∀s = 1; t = 3 . . . T
(7)
The validity of the SYS-GMM estimator depends on two specification tests. First, the Hansen
test for over-identification restrictions which test the overall instrument validity under the null
hypothesis that the instrumented variables are exogenous and uncorrelated with the disturbance
term.13 Its follows a χ2 distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the degree of over-
identification J-K, where J and K are the number of instruments and endogenous variables
respectively . If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the instruments are adjudged valid.
Second is the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. The null hypothesis is that both the first
and second order autoregressive disturbance terms in the first-difference equation are uncorrelated.
However, the difference disturbance term is not allowed to be second-order autocorrelated except
for the first-order; otherwise, the assumption of the GMM estimators becomes violated.
As a caveat, careful attention to limit the instruments’ count is required to avoid excessive
13We present the Hansen test statistic which is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and not the
Sargan test statistic.
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instrument proliferation issues such as over-fitting, weakened tests for over-identifying restrictions,
biased two-step variance estimators and imprecise estimates of the optimal weighting matrix
(Roodman, 2009a,b; Beck et al., 2014). Hence, we use only two to three lags instead of all available
lags of the instruments. Further, we use the two-step GMM which is aymptotically more efficient
than the one-step. In addition, Windmeijer (2005) methodology is employed to obtain robust
standard errors while correcting for finite-sample bias in the two-step variance-covariance matrix.14
3.2 Data
In this study, we use panel data from a sample of 21 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period
1986-2010.15 This period coincides with era of both economic and institutional reforms in the
region. Since 1986, majority of SSA countries have implemented a series of economic liberalization
programmes for deepening the financial markets and also shifted towards democratization of her
legal and political institutional frameworks for greater access and, checks and balances. As typical
of cross-growth regressions, the data is averaged over a 5-year non-overlapping periods to reduce
the effects of business cycles.16
Financial development is measured using only bank-based indicators.17 First is private credit,
measured as domestic credit to private sector by deposit money banks relative to GDP. This bank
development measure captures the allocation of credit in the financial system. It excludes credit
issued to governments, government agencies and public enterprises and the central banks. Overall,
it measures the depth of financial intermediation.18 The second is liquid liabilities (M2/GDP ),
measured as currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and other financial
intermediaries relative to GDP. It captures the broad coverage of financial intermediation activities
across various financial institutions (central banks, deposit money banks and other financial
institutions) relative to the economy’s size. The assumption is that the size of the financial sector
is positively associated with financial services.
For institutional quality, we use two notable measures in the literature: the Economic Freedom
of the World (Freedom) index from Fraser Institute and the Polity2 score from Polity IV Project.
The Freedom index captures the degree of economic freedom underlying five aggregate components
(areas) ranging from government size, legal system and property rights, sound money, regulation
and freedom to trade internationally (Gwartney et al., 2013). Its importance anchors on the
characterization of a country’s effort towards securing private property protection, contract
enforcement and a stable macroeconomic environment; and is measured on a scale of 1 (least free)
14The two-step GMM estimation is performed using Stata command, xtabond2.
15The selected countries include: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo
Republic, Cote d’ Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo.
16The five-year average for the period 1986-2010 are 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010. In
sum, five data points are utilized for each country.
17The measures are preferred over stock market development measures because SSA financial system is predom-
inantly bank-based and stock markets are still being developed.
18This is the most widely used measure of finance in cross-country literature on finance and growth.
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to 10 (most free) and is available for 152 countries in a five year intervals from 1970 and annually
since 2005. The Polity IV project provides a characterization of regimes at a specific time as
reference to the institutionalization of democracy. We use the Polity2 score which is derived from
the combination of both the democracy and autocratic indices based on a 21-point scale ranging
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) as a measure of a country’s level of
democratic institutions.
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US dollars) is used to compute the growth rate.19 Our control
variables include: log of initial (or lagged) GDP per capita to capture possible convergence
effect; inflation defined as the change in GDP price deflator which controls for macroeconomic
stability and price distortions; investment captures the extent of physical capital accumulation
and is defined as gross fixed capital formation relative to GDP; openness to international trade,
defined as the sum of imports and exports relative GDP. With the exception of the institutional
quality indices, the data for other variables are obtained from World Bank’s World Development
Indicators.
Table 1 and Table 2 present the summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables
used in the analysis respectively. As shown in the tables, the mean of the GDP per capita growth
is approximately 3 percent and the standard deviation is quite large. Every other variables exhibit
reasonable variation across time and countries. For the institutional quality measures, the mean
for Polity2 and Freedom are 5.6 and 0.8 respectively, which indicates the quality of institutions in
the SSA countries. With reference to their measurement scale, it means that institutions in the
region are not fully democratic and are partly free. For the financial development indicators, their
average contribution to total output does not exceed 30 percent. Particularly, an average of 21
percent for domestic credit to private sector indicates low financial intermediation in terms of
access to finance for long-term investment. In terms of correlation, the GDP per capita growth
is positively correlated with all other variables except inflation, which is negative. This means,
that macroeconomic instability is detrimental to economic growth. The two financial development
indicators have high positive correlation. For example, the correlation between the private credit
and liquid liabilities is 0.858. For institutional quality indicators, the Polity2 and Freedom indices
are positive correlated at 0.612.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Main Results
The estimation of Eq.2 is performed using both OLS and SYS-GMM estimators and the results
are presented in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. For the estimations, GDP per capita growth
(Growth) is the dependent variable and we use Private Credit as the main financial development
19This is defined as the change in log of GDP per capita
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indicator. Following a stepwise process, we start with a baseline model that includes only the
chosen control variables for a standard growth model (i.e. Initial income, inflation, investment and
trade openness). Next, we introduce the proxies for both financial development and institutional
quality to gauge their direct effects on economic growth; and lastly, augment the model with their
interaction. The discussion follows the two estimation approaches for the purpose of comparison,
although the SYS-GMM is much preferred since it addresses endogeneity issues.
Table 3: OLS regression with Private credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial Income -0.014 -0.020 -0.026* -0.011 -0.030** -0.020
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment 0.081** 0.076** 0.057* 0.050 0.063* 0.052
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Trade Openness 0.094* 0.103* 0.081* 0.109** 0.078* 0.112**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Private credit 0.015 -0.021 -0.012 -0.106 -0.024
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02)
Freedom 0.076*** 0.034
(0.01) (0.05)
Polity2 0.010*** -0.002
(0.00) (0.01)
Private credit*Freedom 0.014
(0.02)
Private credit*Polity2 0.004
(0.00)
Constant -0.496*** -0.515*** -0.682*** -0.488*** -0.423 -0.413***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.31) (0.13)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.246 0.255 0.403 0.378 0.409 0.398
Note:see also note for Table Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** , * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05
and 0.01 level.
As a starting point, we consider the estimated effects of the control variables as shown in
column (1) of Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. Initial Income is negatively signed thus showing
evidence of conditional convergence among SSA countries. The convergence effect holds across
all estimation results as other variables are incorporated, although it is insignificant in majority
of the models. However, the convergence rate is much lower in the SYS-GMM (between -0.001
and -0.030) than in OLS (between -0.011 and -0.030). Inflation as a proxy for macroeconomic
stability is consistently negative across all the estimation except in column (4) of both Table 3 and
Table 4. The negative coefficient is consistent with the argument that macroeconomic instability
is deleterious to economic growth of SSA countries. Higher inflation increases uncertainty and
risk in the economy which can adversely reduce long-term investment. Investment is positive
and statistically significant in the case of SYS-GMM and for OLS with exception of column
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(4) and (6). This is consistent with standard growth theory that emphasizes the importance
of investment through physical capital accumulation in accelerating economic growth. Trade
openness is statistically significant only with OLS in Table 3 and not with SYS-GMM.
Table 4: SYS-GMM regression with Private credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial Income -0.0116 -0.0138 -0.0213 0.0008 -0.0302* -0.0177
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment 0.1144** 0.1150** 0.0981* 0.0986** 0.1119** 0.0999**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Trade Openness 0.0163 0.0175 0.0386 0.0251 0.0363 0.0380
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Private credit 0.0044 -0.0206 -0.0170 -0.2001* -0.0317*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02)
Freedom 0.0533** -0.0330
(0.02) (0.06)
Polity2 0.0070*** -0.0079
(0.00) (0.01)
Private credit*Freedom 0.0301
(0.02)
Private credit*Polity2 0.0056
(0.00)
Constant -0.2834 -0.2859 -0.5605*** -0.3989** -0.0321 -0.2519
(0.23) (0.24) (0.18) (0.16) (0.37) (0.17)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Wald Chi2 63.34 79.42 92.32 162.07 149.76 320.71
AR(1) (p-value) 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.069 0.080
AR(2) (p-value) 0.666 0.706 0.418 0.732 0.329 0.525
Hansen test (p-value) 0.302 0.288 0.278 0.364 0.318 0.377
Note: see also note for Table Table 2. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** , * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. All regressions includes both country-
specific effects and time-period effects. Model specifications statistics includes Wald Chi2, P-values of Hansen test for
over-identifying restrictions, AR(1) and AR(2) test of the disturbance error terms.
Turning to the financial development indicator included in column (2), private credit although
positive, is statistically insignificant in both OLS and SYS-GMM estimations. As such, financial
development has not stimulated growth at least in the short-run for SSA countries. The result is
consistent with Demetriades and Law (2006) for low-income countries and Demetriades and James
(2011) when finance is measured using bank credit for SSA countries. What factors explains such
an outcome? First, majority of SSA economies are driven by natural resource endowments (e.g.
oil) which generates foreign exchange for economic management. Secondly, SSA is characterized by
low levels of financial development. As the dominant financial sector, the banking system accounts
for majority of the financial assets and liabilities; and is prone to excess liquidity, preference for
government securities and short-term lending with maturity period of less than a year. These
factors in addition to low income levels, a large informal sector, infrastructural weakness to
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mention a few, inhibits the effectiveness of the capital accumulation and technological innovation
channels through which finance contributes to growth. Also, the result raises concerns on the
success of financial reforms so far implemented. Such if any, may be conditional on the existing
institutional quality as emphasized by World Bank studies that information problems and weak
contract enforcements rather than savings mobilization are the binding constraint on financial
deepening in SSA (Demetriades and James, 2011).
The measures of institutional quality – Freedom and Polity2 indices – are introduced in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. The coefficients of both indices are positively
signed and statistically significant. This is consistent with the empirical literature on institutions
and growth (see Acemoglu et al., 2001; Akpan and Effiong, 2012; Nawaz, 2015). Hence, the quality
of institutions is crucial in explaining the economic performance of SSA, as countries with better
institutions are likely to experience improved economic progress in contrast to those with weak
institutions. For emphasis, the inclusion of the indices does not significantly alter previous results
in columns (1) and (2) for both OLS and SYS-GMM regressions except for the change in the sign
of the financial variable from positive to negative. A look into their association in Table 2 shows a
low correlation value of 0.214 and 0.398 for Polity2 and Freedom indices respectively. Hence, the
change in sign might be unrelated to issues of multicollinearity.
Next, the interaction term between finance and the institutional indices are introduced and
reported in columns (5) and (6) respectively for Table 3 and Table 4. As a recall, the interaction
term depending on its coefficient sign, is useful in gauging whether finance and institutions are
complements or substitutes for growth; whereas its insignificance (irrespective of the sign) would
imply that the finance-growth relationship is not conditioned by institutional quality. In Table 3,
the OLS estimates of the interaction terms are positively signed, suggesting the complementarity
of both factors; however, they are insignificant. Again, the financial variable (private credit)
maintains the same negative sign as obtained in column (2). Across these regressions, both finance
and institutional variables are insignificant when their interaction is included.
The SYS-GMM regressions in Table 4 is similar to that of the OLS in Table 3. Both interaction
terms are positive but insignificant. The only exception being that private credit is statistically
significant when interaction terms are included and endogeneity issues controlled for in the
regression. Such may suggest that institutions alleviates the negative impact of finance, thus
making it relevant in the growth process. However, much importance is not attached to this
findings until further verification through robust checks. In terms, of the sign of the interaction
coefficient estimates, our findings is consistent with Demetriades and Law (2006) and Anwar and
Cooray (2012) but contrary to Compton and Giedeman (2011). Its statistical insignificance suggest
that the impact of financial development on growth performance in SSA countries is invariant
across different levels of institutional quality. In other words, the existing institutional quality has
not enhanced the finance-growth nexus in the region. This outcome is not surprising given that
majority of SSA countries have weak institutions. In most circumstances, the institutions required
for efficient functioning of the financial sector is characterized by weak contractual frameworks.
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Property rights (including those of the creditors) are ill-defined with weak enforcement mechanism
as the judicial system lacks credibility and independence while being controlled by the government
in power. Hence, the combination of weak institutions and low financial development would
inhibit future growth prospects. For the validity of the SYS-GMM regressions, the Hansen test
for over-identifying restrictions and the serial correlation Arellano-Bond test are not rejected. The
instruments are exogenous and uncorrelated with the disturbance error term and second order
serial correlation is absent. Therefore, the estimates are consistent and satisfactory.
4.2 Robustness Analysis
To ascertain the robustness of the empirical results above, Eq. 2 is modified in two ways. First, an
alternative measure of financial development is used, as the result could be sensitive to different
proxies as seen with Demetriades and James (2011). Second, South Africa as the largest economy
in the region with higher per capita income, developed financial sector and better institutional
quality is excluded to curtail its influence on the result.20
In place of private credit, liquid liabilities is used as the alternative indicator of financial
development. The results for both OLS and SYS-GMM regressions are reported in Table A1 and
Table A2 in the Appendix. The result is invariant with earlier results. The financial development
indicator is positively significant in the OLS regression (column 1, Table A1) only. Introducing
the institutional indices renders it insignificant with a negative sign. Meanwhile, the institutional
indices maintain their positive and significant impact on growth. However, both the financial and
institutional measures become insignificant upon introducing their interaction terms albeit the
latter being positive and insignificant.
The estimation result when South Africa is excluded is reported in Table A3 and Table A4
for only SYS-GMM regressions for both indicators of financial development respectively. Again,
there is no significant variation as earlier results are robust irrespective of whether South Africa is
excluded or not and the proxy measures for financial development.21 Therefore, the results are
generally robust.
5 Concluding Remark
This paper examined the effect of financial development on economic growth conditional on a
country’s institutional quality for a panel of 21 SSA countries for the period 1986-2010. Our
research was motivated by the mixed evidence from the empirical literature on the interaction effect
of financial development and institutions on economic growth as obtained from an heterogeneous
sample of both developed and developing countries. We argued that a region-specific analysis
20Due to the periods covered, consideration is not given to Nigeria’s GDP rebasing which has seen her emergence
as the largest economy in SSA.
21The same results is obtained for OLS regression. Hence, it is not reported but available on request.
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involving countries with homogeneity in economic fundamentals, culture and history was necessary
for relevant policy implications. Further, linking SSA reforms with economic performance for both
financial sector and institutional capacity was expedient. For this purpose, a standard growth
regression model was estimated using both OLS and SYS-GMM panel data techniques along with
two measures each of financial development and institutional quality.
The results indicate that financial development has not impacted on SSA growth performance.
While not surprising, financial development in the region is generally low with a dominant banking
system and characterized by excess liquidity, holdings of government securities, short-term lending
etc. Implicitly, it suggest that financial sector reforms has not achieved the desired deepening of
the financial system let alone contribute to economic growth. On the other hand, institutions has a
significant positive impact on economic growth in SSA. Good institutions facilitates property rights
protection, constrains government and other interest groups and ultimately creates a conducive
economic climate for market interaction among economic agents in a society. Hence, current
efforts on building effective institutional capacity should be intensified for the sustainability
of the region’s economic recovery. Meanwhile, the interaction between financial development
and institutions on economic growth, although positive (i.e. both factors are complements) is
statistically insignificant. Since financial development is low, and the existing institutions are
weak and inadequate for enforcing financial contracts and alleviating information problems, as
their combination undermines future growth prospects.
Taken as a whole, the results implies that the effect of financial development conditional on
existing institutional quality on SSA economic growth is non-existent. Therefore, policy drive of
government should be tailored towards the financial sector and institutional development. In fact,
efforts should target improving the set of institutions relevant to the financial system for free flow
of information, enforcing contracts and property rights protection.
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Appendix
Table A1: OLS regression with Liquid liabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Income -0.023* -0.031** -0.014 -0.032** -0.024*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment 0.076** 0.054* 0.048 0.057* 0.049
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Trade Openness 0.092* 0.095** 0.117** 0.092* 0.118***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Liquid Liabilities 0.048** -0.026 -0.013 -0.118 -0.037
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.03)
Freedom 0.075*** 0.026
(0.02) (0.08)
Polity2 0.009*** -0.015
(0.00) (0.02)
Liquid Liabilities*Freedom 0.015
(0.02)
Liquid Liabilities*Polity2 0.007
(0.00)
Constant -0.565*** -0.669*** -0.485*** -0.356 -0.355**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.55) (0.15)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.279 0.395 0.375 0.398 0.395
Note:see also note for Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** , * denotes significance at 0.10,
0.05 and 0.01 level.
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Table A2: SYS-GMM regression with Liquid liabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Income -0.0168 -0.0260 -0.0062 -0.0309 -0.0230
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment 0.1152** 0.0940* 0.0965** 0.1066** 0.0968***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Trade Openness 0.0128 0.0505 0.0355 0.0455 0.0470
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Liquid Liabilities 0.0360 -0.0086 -0.0088 -0.2422 -0.0401
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.24) (0.05)
Freedom 0.0462* -0.0772
(0.03) (0.13)
Polity2 0.0066*** -0.0224
(0.00) (0.02)
Liquid Liabilities*Freedom 0.0372
(0.04)
Liquid Liabilities*Polity2 0.0091
(0.01)
Constant -0.3215 -0.5533*** -0.3443* 0.2888 -0.1984
(0.24) (0.18) (0.19) (0.80) (0.19)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84
Wald Chi 95.63 94.9 203.62 154.6 307.23
AR(1) (p-value) 0.068 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.076
AR(2) (p-value) 0.826 0.514 0.829 0.491 0.655
Hansen test (p-value) 0.248 0.257 0.337 0.283 0.292
Note: see also note for Table 2. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** , * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. All regressions includes both
country-specific effects and time-period effects. Model specifications statistics includes Wald Chi2, P-values of
Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions, AR(1) and AR(2) test of the disturbance error terms.
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Table A3: SYS-GMM regression with Private credit excluding South Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial Income -0.0241 -0.0246 -0.0363 -0.0054 -0.0380* -0.0161
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment 0.1107** 0.1142** 0.0938** 0.1049** 0.1076** 0.1062**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Trade 0.0385 0.0368 0.0692 0.0350 0.0556 0.0329
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Private credit -0.0040 -0.0393* -0.0237 -0.1830 -0.0313
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02)
Freedom 0.0648*** -0.0112
(0.02) (0.08)
Polity2 0.0070*** -0.0082
(0.00) (0.01)
Private credit*Freedom 0.0253
(0.02)
Private credit*Polity2 0.0057
(0.00)
Constant -0.2861 -0.2754 -0.5800*** -0.3916** -0.1355 -0.2932*
(0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.17) (0.47) (0.16)
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80
Wald Chi 56.36 68.2 79.08 145.2 157.25 223.16
AR(1) (p-value) 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.070 0.081
AR(2) (p-value) 0.753 0.728 0.431 0.757 0.334 0.522
Hansen test (p-value) 0.286 0.29 0.306 0.401 0.356 0.361
Note: see also note for Table 2. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***, ** , * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. All regressions includes both country-specific ef-
fects and time-period effects. Model specifications statistics includes Wald Chi2, P-values of Hansen test for overidentifying
restrictions, AR(1) and AR(2) test of the disturbance error terms.
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Table A4: SYS-GMM regression with Liquid liabilities excluding South Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Income -0.0229 -0.0369 -0.0090 -0.0432 -0.0252
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Inflation -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment 0.1158** 0.0875* 0.0999*** 0.1008** 0.1003***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Trade Openness 0.0233 0.0760 0.0408 0.0761 0.0533
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Liquid Liabilities 0.0303 -0.0274 -0.0157 -0.2739 -0.0464
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.24) (0.06)
Freedom 0.0559* -0.0735
(0.03) (0.13)
Polity2 0.0066*** -0.0224
(0.00) (0.02)
Liquid Liabilities*Freedom 0.0390
(0.04)
Liquid Liabilities*Polity2 0.0091
(0.01)
Constant -0.3098 -0.5538*** -0.3887** 0.3014 -0.2015
(0.25) (0.19) (0.19) (0.79) (0.19)
Observations 80 80 80 80 80
Wald Chi 80.61 87.48 188.31 191.44 258.19
AR(1) (p-value) 0.066 0.061 0.062 0.060 0.075
AR(2) (p-value) 0.839 0.509 0.842 0.508 0.676
Hansen test (p-value) 0.257 0.282 0.352 0.336 0.315
Note: see also note for Table 2. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** , * denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. All regressions includes both
country-specific effects and time-period effects. Model specifications statistics includes Wald Chi2, P-values of
Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions, AR(1) and AR(2) test of the disturbance error terms.
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